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ABSTRACT 
INNOVATIONS IN STATE-LEVEL SOLAR ENERGY POLICY:  
MOTIVATING COMMUNITY INVESTMENT IN RESILIENCY 
 
by 
Sarah Katheryn Gentile 
Community-level resilience in the face of climate change is critical for New Jersey. 
Through a review of current literature, evidence is provided that a majority of work being 
done with respect to climate-change planning is taking place at the local level. On the 
basis of case-study analyses, three community renewable energy projects are examined as 
well as two policy tools that are helping to facilitate development of local capacity to 
generate renewable energy. The best elements of these initiatives are extracted and form 
the basis of a policy discussion intended to encourage local level generation of renewable 
energy, thereby increasing community resilience.  
 The five case studies presented can be summarized as follows: (1) In Fintry, 
Scotland, a local community is receiving financial compensation for hosting a large-scale 
wind farm; (2) In Brighton, England, a solar cooperative is distributing proceeds from 
three solar arrays back to investors; (3) In New Jersey, a solar array equipped with 
backup power capability is allowing a school in Bayonne to continue to function in the 
event of power grid failure; (4) Also in New Jersey, government-energy aggregation is 
discussed in terms of its potential to empower municipalities to make more informed and 
environmentally conscious choices with respect to their aggregated energy purchases; and 
(5) In Vermont, proposed legislation—in the form of the Vermont Common Assets 
Trust—places a price tag on the use/extraction of natural resources (renewable or 
otherwise) with the aim of charging developers for their appropriation. 
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CHAPTER 1   
INTRODUCTION 
 
1.1 Objective 
The objective of this thesis is to emphasize the need for community-level renewable 
energy as a means of increasing local resiliency.   
 
1.2 Background Information 
 
New Jersey is characterized as one of the most progressive states in the United States 
when it comes to promoting renewable energy production. The state has an aggressive 
Renewable Portfolio Standard (RPS) which requires that electricity suppliers purchase a 
portion of their supply from clean sources or pay an Alternative Compliance Payment 
(ACP). New Jersey’s RPS is legislatively mandated to increase every year until 2028, at 
which point 22.5% of the electricity supplied to customers in the state will be generated 
from clean and renewable sources. In this regard, New Jersey is one of the most proactive 
states when it comes to incorporating renewables into its energy mix.  
 Despite the gains made by virtue of a strong RPS, one area where New Jersey is 
falling behind is in the development and facilitation of local-level (or community) 
renewable energy generation. Elsewhere in the world, localities are benefiting twofold: 
firstly by generating their own clean energy, and secondly by receiving compensation for 
hosting private clean energy projects. Current literature suggests that community 
renewable energy generation is a key component of local action to address climate-
change. As such, New Jersey’s energy policies require a shift in focus toward facilitating 
local level renewable energy generation if comprehensive climate-change planning is to 
be achieved. 
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 The motivation behind this study began in the summer of 2012 with a general 
desire to explore how community renewable energy projects could become more prolific 
in New Jersey. Then, on October 29, 2012, Superstorm Sandy made landfall near 
Brigantine, New Jersey. Over two million households in the state lost power in the storm, 
346,000 homes were damaged or destroyed, and 37 people were killed.
1
 Whether it is 
agreed upon or not that Superstorm Sandy was a climate-change related weather event, 
the fact remains that in the aftermath of the storm, resiliency planning was thrust into the 
spotlight in New Jersey. Local governments, corporations, utilities, even residents in New 
Jersey, began to think about and talk about what resiliency measures could be undertaken 
to better prepare for the next weather event. Utilities began to invest in electrical 
substation hardening, private corporations investigated redundancy in electric service, 
local governments applied by the hundreds for Federal funding to purchase generators for 
backup power, and residents started the process of elevating their homes in order to meet 
new flood insurance standards. As a State, New Jersey began the process of becoming 
more resilient at every level. 
 Partly in reaction to Superstorm Sandy, this study shifted focus from a pure 
assessment of community renewable energy projects to one that explores the potential 
overlaps between local-level solar projects and resiliency. The intent was to expose 
community-level solar projects which provide backup power to the general public in the 
event of an emergency as projects that propel forward two important policy objectives 
instead of just one. As explained in forthcoming chapters of this study, if planned and 
executed properly, a community-level solar project equipped with the necessary 
technology to provide backup power to the public in the event of an emergency achieves 
                                                          
1
 See http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Effects_of_Hurricane_Sandy_in_New_Jersey 
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the goals of comprehensive climate-change adaptation and mitigation planning, with 
resiliency in mind.  
 Chapter 2 of this study outlines current and relevant research on climate-change 
planning and community renewable energy production. Chapter 2’s literature review is 
divided into four sections: 1) Mitigation, Adaptation, Resilience & Sustainable 
Development; 2) Common Ground: Where Mitigation, Adaptation, Resilience & 
Sustainable Development Overlap; 3) Community-Level Motivation; and 4) Community 
Renewable Energy. The goal of this chapter is to present relevant literature on both topics 
– community renewable energy and climate-change planning - and in doing so explain 
the natural areas of overlap and the potential for both goals to be achieved concurrently. 
This chapter also introduces relevant terms and concepts that are referenced throughout 
the study. 
 Chapter 3 describes the methodology of this study. The study initially utilizes a 
case study format to analyze community renewable energy policies as well as projects 
implemented in various locations (Chapter 4). The purpose of analyzing these policies 
and projects is to better inform potential policy decisions and planning tools open to the 
state of New Jersey. The best elements of these projects and policies were then extracted 
to form the basis of a larger policy discussion that highlights options that the state could 
implement moving forward. The resulting policy discussion (Chapter 5) was then 
reviewed by a panel of five experts in the solar energy field: a regulatory official from the 
New Jersey Board of Public Utilities (NJBPU), a regulatory official from the United 
States Environmental Protection Agency (USEPA), a representative from the solar 
development industry in New Jersey, a representative from a community non-profit 
organization in New Jersey, and a general New Jersey energy policy expert. The 
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feedback received from each of the five experts was used to inform Chapter 6 – the final 
policy development and summary chapter of this study. 
 As discussed, Chapter 4 presents the five case studies analyzed during this study. 
Two state level policies – New Jersey Government Energy Aggregation and the Vermont 
Common Assets Trust – are examined for their relative effectiveness in facilitating 
community renewable energy projects. Three community renewable energy projects – a 
wind project in Scotland, a solar co-operative in England, and a solar installation at a 
school in New Jersey – are examined for lessons learned. The five case studies, taken 
together, reveal a suite of policy options open to the state of New Jersey and also provide 
critical information about the challenges faced, drawbacks, and successes experienced by 
each project and serve together to better inform New Jersey’s path forward. 
 Chapter 5 presents the policy discussion that emerged from the case study 
analyses and literature review previously discussed. The text of Chapter 5 represents the 
material that was reviewed by the panel of experts. The feedback from the panel is 
examined in the final Chapter 6, which further refines the policy ideas discussed in 
Chapter 5 and presents a summary of the conclusions of this study. The study concludes 
that community renewable energy projects are an invaluable tool when it comes to local 
level resilience in light of climate-change. It is determined that the tools necessary to 
facilitate these types of projects exist today, the State and Federal governments have a 
critical support function to fulfill, but in the end local governments will likely need to act 
in their own self-interest in order to propel successful community renewable energy 
projects that increase local level resiliency forward. 
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CHAPTER 2 
LITERATURE REVIEW 
 
2.1 Introduction 
The following literature review is divided into four sections: 1) Mitigation, Adaptation, 
Resilience and Sustainable Development; 2) Common Ground: Where Mitigation, 
Adaptation, Resilience and Sustainable Development Overlap; 3) Community-Level 
Motivation; and 4) Community Renewable Energy. The first section provides a historical 
basis for the need to synergize the work of mitigation, adaptation, resilience, and 
sustainable development in order to holistically and effectively address climate-change. 
The second section explores natural areas of overlap among the different disciplines and 
where those inherent synergies could be capitalized upon to achieve multiple goals. The 
third section explores community-level motivation for climate-change action in the face 
of a lack of state and/or federal support. The fourth and final section discusses specific 
community renewable energy projects and how they could achieve the goals of 
mitigation, adaptation, resilience, and sustainable development. Cooperation within the 
climate-change community is paramount. Areas are highlighted where such cooperation 
can be achieved without sacrificing any particular discipline’s tenets. The importance of 
action at the local level on climate-change is highlighted and ideas for projects that 
communities can implement to achieve a wide range of goals are provided. 
 
2.2 Mitigation, Adaptation, Resilience and Sustainable Development 
A significant volume of research exists on climate-change mitigation versus adaptation 
and where limited time and resources should be focused to achieve the greatest impact 
addressing biospheric warming and its consequences (Haque & Burton, 2005; Larsen & 
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Gunnarsson-Ostling, 2009). Mitigation proponents, on one hand, argue that without 
immediate action to reduce greenhouse-gas (GHG) emissions, success slowing down or 
reducing the effects of climate-change is not possible. Adaptation proponents, on the 
other hand, argue that much can be done right now to adjust to climate-change and the 
new reality it brings (Hamin & Gurran, 2009). Not only is there much disagreement 
regarding the proper path forward, there is also divergence with regard to how the terms 
adaptation and mitigation are defined (Haque & Burton, 2005). Also in question is where 
climate-change mitigation and adaptation fit within the larger realm of sustainable 
development (Larsen & Gunnarsson-Ostling, 2009). 
 The Intergovernmental Panel on Climate-change (IPCC) defines mitigation as: 
“Technological change and substitution that reduce resource inputs and emissions per 
unit of output. Although several social, economic, and technological policies would 
produce an emission reduction, with respect to climate-change, mitigation means 
implementing policies to reduce GHG emissions and enhance sinks” (IPCC, 2007). The 
IPCC then defines adaptation as: “Initiatives and measures to reduce the vulnerability of 
natural and human systems against actual or expected climate-change effects. Various 
types of adaptation exist, e.g. anticipatory and reactive, private and public, and 
autonomous and planned. Examples are raising river or coastal dikes, the substitution of 
more temperature-shock resistant plants for sensitive ones, etc” (IPCC, 2007). Based 
upon these definitions, it is not hard to understand where the conflict between mitigation 
and adaptation arises. Mitigation advocates value GHG reductions above all else as the 
ultimate tool to handling the problem of climate-change. Adaptation advocates argue 
instead that while GHG reductions are important, the ability to take other measures to 
adjust to the inevitable changes that a warmer climate brings should not be discounted 
(Hamin & Gurran, 2009). Historically, these two realms have operated virtually 
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independently from one another, but recent studies have revealed that each separately on 
its own will not be sufficient. Thus, the study of how to integrate the two concepts by 
finding areas of common ground has arisen (Wilbanks, 2005). 
 An important third concept that is often discussed along with climate-change 
mitigation and adaptation is the notion of resilience. Again, the IPCC defines resilience 
as the: “Amount of change a system can undergo without changing state” (IPCC, 2001). 
This definition in itself – which implies that to achieve a resilient state means the system 
remains intact or unchanged in state – is often criticized heavily by sustainable 
development advocates (Rose, 2011; Hess, 2010). The IPCC defines sustainable 
development as: “A process of change in which the exploitation of resources, the 
direction of investments, the orientation of technological development and institutional 
change are all in harmony and enhance both current and future potential to meet human 
needs and aspirations. Sustainable Development integrates the political, social, economic 
and environmental dimensions” (IPCC, 2007).  
 Sustainable development advocates emphasize that a new paradigm, in other 
words a complete change in state, is necessary to redirect from the current path of 
overconsumption and resource depletion to one that that is instead sustainable. When the 
notion of an extreme change in state underlying sustainable development is compared 
with the lack of change in state underlying resilience, the potential conflict between the 
two theories becomes clear. As exemplified in a New York Times article entitled 
“Learning to Bounce Back” by Andrew Zolli (2012): “A shift from sustainability to 
resilience leaves many old-school environmentalists and social activists feeling uneasy, 
as it smacks of adaptation, a word that is still taboo in many quarters. If we adapt to 
unwanted change, the reasoning goes, we give a pass to those responsible for putting us 
in this mess in the first place, and we lose the moral authority to pressure them to stop. 
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Better, they argue, to mitigate the risk at the source. In a perfect world, that’s surely true, 
just as it’s also true that the cheapest response to a catastrophe is to prevent it in the first 
place. But in this world, vulnerable people are already being affected by disruption. They 
need practical, if imperfect, adaptations now, if they are ever to get the just and moral 
future they deserve tomorrow.”  
 As shown, some of these concepts, as well as their supporters, seem to be in 
conflict with one another (Wilbanks, 2005). How does a scientist who sees a drastic 
reduction in GHG emissions as the only way to have any chance at mitigating the effects 
of global climate-change, ever agree that adapting lifestyles and culture to a changing 
climate should be the path forward? With severely limited resources and finances to 
address climate-change, who wins and who loses in this debate (Hasson, et al. 2010)? Is it 
instead possible to find areas of common ground between mitigation, adaptation, 
resilience, and sustainable development that allow for strides toward achieving some of 
the goals of all four concepts? Hess (2010) concludes that “resilience-oriented 
consumption may potentially undermine sustainable consumption, but it may also be 
configured to enhance it as well.” Perhaps these concepts can be utilized in ways that 
complement one another instead of remaining at odds. 
 
2.3 Common Ground: Where Mitigation, Adaptation, Resilience, and 
Sustainable Development Overlap 
 
There is literature to suggest movement in the direction of cooperation. Biesbroek et al. 
(2009) suggest that ‘‘the recent understanding of the link between climate-change and 
sustainable development has accelerated a shift in the way solutions to climate-change 
are conceived from the one-sided scientific focus on climate-change, towards a trans-
disciplinary and sustainable development perspective.’’ The authors of this study claim 
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that the historical conflict between mitigation and adaptation camps is one rooted in 
vastly different viewpoints and approaches to solving a problem. Mitigation advocates, 
namely scientists, think about the solution to a problem in a very specific way that differs 
from the way spatial planners, who generally make up the adaptation community, think 
about and approach problems. However, Biesbroek et al. conclude that the study of 
climate-change is broadening away from a singular focus on science to include more 
disciplines like sociology and planning which opens the door for new areas of 
collaboration. In fact, a special issue of Habitat International, published in 2009, was 
devoted to uncovering the areas in which these philosophically diverse concepts (ex: 
adaptation vs. mitigation and resilience vs. sustainability) might overlap and thus provide 
opportunities for coordination to achieve mutually beneficial goals. “The special issue is 
based on the premise that it is crucial to develop a sound understanding of the synergies, 
conflicts and trade-offs between mitigation and adaptation measures in order to achieve a 
more integrated climate policy and to build resilient regions, towns and cities to face 
climate-change” (Pizarro, 2009). 
 If building more resilient regions, towns and cities to face climate-change 
becomes a collective goal of advocates of mitigation and adaptation what then are the 
logical steps forward? How equipped are regions, towns and cities to face climate-change 
in this manner (Jabareen, 2012)? Speaking to this point, the same special editorial issue 
of Habitat International referenced above also highlights an article by Jose de Oliveira 
(2009), which concludes, according to the author of the editorial, “that, paradoxically, to 
implement policies and strategies to tackle mitigation measures can be easier and more 
efficient to implement at the sub-national (county, city and local) levels than at higher 
scales of government” (Pizarro, 2009).  
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 If de Oliveira is correct, and it is easier to tackle climate-change issues at the local 
level, is the local level also the place where the goals of mitigation, adaptation, resilience, 
and sustainable development can overlap? Higher levels of government in the United 
States – namely the federal and state levels – are having a great deal of difficulty reaching 
consensus, first on whether or not climate-change is occurring and, if it is occurring, what 
should be done about it both in the immediate term and in the long term. The federal 
government in the United States lacks a consolidated energy policy to lay forth a national 
agenda to address climate-change. At the state level, the issue is highly political and 
partisan, leaving states largely at the mercy of elected officials’ political persuasions to 
determine whether or not action on climate-change will be undertaken.  
 As de Oliveira (2009) points out, “Subnational governments (cities, states, 
counties) have taken the lead to tackle climate-change even in countries where national 
governments have been reluctant to support international efforts for controlling the 
greenhouse effect, such as the United States.” This assertion is echoed by Kousky and 
Schneider (2003) and Peterson and Rose (2006) who agree that a lack of national action 
in the United States to combat climate-change has created a proactive attitude on the part 
of many local governments to do something even in the absence of leadership from their 
state or federal agencies. This idea of local government being the hotspot for climate-
change activity is also echoed by Senbel et al. (2012) who state that “while all levels of 
government can potentially make valuable contributions to mitigation (Collier, 1997; 
Betsill, 2001), untenable climate-change impacts are likely without the widespread 
involvement of municipal governments” (Betsill, 2000; Lindseth, 2004). It is interesting 
to note, that while local governments are engaging more actively in climate-change work, 
it would seem that not all of their constituents are supportive. A backlash against 
municipal action on climate-change has been spearheaded by specific political factions 
 
 
11 
 
who believe that local efforts on this front are no more than a masked attempt by 
government to curtail their property rights and force them to live in cities (Kaufman & 
Zernike, 2012).   
 
2.4 Community-Level Motivation 
In spite of this backlash, local governments are continuing to push forward with their 
work on climate-change. What are the motivating factors behind local action on climate-
change? As Senbel et al. (2012) explain, “Municipal governments are primarily 
responsible for overseeing a large number of activities that affect GHG-emissions levels, 
including controlling land use and development through zoning regulations and official 
plans; issuing building permits and approving major developments; controlling parking 
supply and rates, roads, and public transit; owning and/or regulating municipal power and 
natural gas utilities and district-heating systems; coordinating waste management; and 
managing parks and recreation services” (DeAngelo & Harvey, 1998; Robinson & Gore, 
2005). As such, municipal governments have the power to make changes that can 
drastically reduce GHG emissions within their jurisdiction. But is their ability to 
effectuate measureable change the only reason for their action on climate-change? 
 As hypothesized by de Oliveira (2009) and discussed earlier, a contributing factor 
could also be that it is simply easier for a local government to take these proactive steps 
forward on climate-change and that similar steps would be much harder for state and 
federal governments to gain sufficient consensus to implement. Also, it could be assumed 
that it is much quicker to make these kinds of changes, which generally require 
stakeholder involvement, at the local level as opposed to the state or federal levels where 
the universe of stakeholders is much larger. And lastly, as de Oliveira (2009) also 
articulates, another contributing factor is that communities are closer to their constituents 
 
 
12 
 
in a way that makes them more sympathetic to the eventual hardships that their 
community members will endure as a result of governmental inaction on climate-change. 
In this way it would appear that local governments perceive a greater direct risk to their 
constituents than perhaps national political figures do. All of this is not to say that there 
are not significant obstacles to local governments acting on climate-change without state 
or federal support. For instance, the backlash that local climate-change work has created 
in some municipalities is just one example of the many obstacles that local governments 
face. Yet still, local governments across the United States are taking proactive steps to act 
to protect their communities from the effects of climate-change. 
 The ways in which local governments are engaging in climate-change work 
varies. According to Senbel et al. (2012), “despite the aversion to climate-change 
planning and the refusal of the federal government in the United States to sign any 
climate-protection agreement, by October 2009, 1,000 mayors, representing more than a 
quarter of the country’s population, had signed such a compact [adopting targets for 
emissions reductions] (USCM, 2009)”. It seems clear that local governments are working 
on mitigation. Kousky and Schneider (2003) conducted interviews aimed at 
understanding the motivation behind this phenomenon. “The interviews suggest that local 
mitigation policy is predominantly a top-down decision based on what officials or staff 
members believe to be ‘good business’ or rational economic and political choices. In the 
majority of cities, policy is not driven primarily by widespread public pressure, nor 
wholly for climate protection, but instead, justified by cost savings and other perceived 
co-benefits” (Kousky and Scheider, 2003).  
 What other motivating factors are at work at the local level? Adaptation certainly 
becomes important for localities that perceive themselves to be at a much higher risk with 
respect to the anticipated effects of unmitigated climate-change: rising sea level, 
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increased extreme temperatures and frequency of severe storm events, and so forth. For 
coastal communities prone to flooding, certainly their desire to adapt to climate-change 
(or mitigate it in fact) is greater than for other communities who perceive their risks to be 
lower. This is also where resilience becomes prominent. Using the example of 
California’s electricity sector and its efforts to adapt to climate-change, an article by Vine 
(2012) recommends a portfolio of strategies to combat climate-change including 
mitigation, adaptation, technological development, and research. It goes on to state that 
“adaptation and mitigation should follow the guiding principle of ‘resilience’ - enhancing 
the capacity of the system to operate under a range of future environmental and socio-
economic conditions that can be anticipated as possible and plausible but that cannot be 
predicted with certainty” (Franco and Sanstad, 2006). 
 How does a local government follow the same advice given to California’s 
electricity sector? What does implementing adaptation and mitigation strategies that 
follow the guiding principle of resilience mean? The first challenge is to uncover where 
adaptation and mitigation meet at the project level. As referenced earlier in our discussion 
of definitions, recall that mitigation refers to a reduction in GHG emissions while 
adaptation refers to initiatives that reduce the vulnerability of a system to the effects of 
climate-change. A focus on resilience would be one that encourages the implementation 
of strategies that help a system (or community) “bounce back” in the face of stress.  
 
2.5 Community Renewable Energy 
How can local governments make sound decisions to invest in renewable energy projects 
that achieve mitigation, adaptation, resilience, and sustainable development goals and 
implement them in their communities? According to Diane Cardwell (2012) some local 
governments have already done so. Referring to the time period just after Superstorm 
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Sandy in 2012, Caldwell writes, “In Bayonne, New Jersey, a school with an unusual 
coupling of a solar array and a backup diesel generator found itself chugging along 
through the storm and its aftermath, allowing more than 50 residents to spend the night 
that Sandy hit on cots in a heated, dry and well-lighted community room.” This is an 
example of a hybrid grid-tied solar array with battery backup technology that not only 
enabled the school to maintain power when the grid failed, but it also allowed the facility 
to act as an emergency shelter for local residents unable to remain in their homes as a 
result of the storm. As such, this type of project at the community-level achieves 
mitigation and adaptation goals, guided by resilience. 
 There is substantial literature spanning a variety of topics related to local level 
renewable energy generation (Walker, 2008; Hain et al., 2005; Rogers et al., 2008; 
Hielscher et al., 2013). Some of this work focuses on the term “community renewable 
energy” and what it should mean with respect to who participates and most importantly, 
who benefits from such projects. Much of the literature on this topic is authored by 
Gordon Walker, a geographer based at Lancaster University in the UK, who argues that a 
true community renewable energy project should not simply be one that a local 
government constructs at (or on) a public facility and then the profits remain entirely 
within the government coffers. Instead, he argues that a true community green energy 
project should involve engagement from residents, active participation in the planning on 
the part of community members, and most importantly an opportunity for the locals 
themselves to share in the positive outcomes of such a project – i.e., allows them access 
to the green energy produced or at least an economic share of the profits, if any. 
“Considerations of equity and the distribution of costs and benefits have been shown to 
be important in local debates about many development proposals (Lesbirel and Shaw, 
2005; Wolsink, 2007) and in this respect community projects are no different—indeed 
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labeling a project as community and then local people feeling they are getting nothing out 
of it will itself simply increase the scope for resentment and objection” (Walker & 
Devine-Wright, 2008).  
 Walker, along with colleagues Devine-Wright, Hunter, High and Evans (2010), 
expand upon this concept in further work to explain that these dynamics are exemplified 
by the devastating effects that a lack of community trust can have on a project of this 
nature. If the community does not trust that its local government is going to include 
residents in the planning process for these types of projects, or if they do not believe that 
the benefits of such a project will ever touch them, their support tends to drastically 
diminish.  
 As such, a solar installation like the one previously described in which the 
community tangentially benefits from mitigation benefits like cleaner air, reduced GHG 
emissions, and so forth, while also directly benefiting from adaptation and resilience 
features like having a public place to use as a shelter during an extreme emergency, 
makes it a clear example of where climate-change mitigation and adaptation overlap with 
resilience as a guiding principle. Such a project exemplifies true community green energy 
at the same time that it addresses both mitigation and adaptation. In fact, it employs both 
strategies in a way that also builds community resilience.  
 
2.6 Conclusion 
Climate-change is an issue of great magnitude. It will take a coordinated and calculated 
effort to effectively address its impacts. The tools are available; they need to be 
assembled in the right way. The four areas of climate-change study examined herein, 
adaptation, mitigation, resilience and sustainable development, while they differ greatly 
in some ways also overlap naturally in other ways. It is in locating these areas of natural 
 
 
16 
 
synergy that opportunities for compromise and progress can be found. There are projects 
that can achieve all four goals. If these types of projects are implemented at the local 
level – and ensure that the community itself benefits – change can be effectuated that 
holistically addresses climate-change in our communities.  
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CHAPTER 3 
METHODOLOGY 
 
Community renewable energy generation can be a vehicle for climate-change action at 
the local level. As discussed, significant action on climate-change is occurring at the local 
level. Powerful progress in this regard will occur when municipalities (or other local 
entities) begin to generate their own clean energy for more than solely economic reasons. 
While cost savings are important and worthwhile, when financial considerations are the 
only consideration, a project can miss out on the chance to have far greater impacts for 
both the local entity itself and the community members it serves.   
 Understanding this, five case studies are presented that illuminate different 
aspects of local level clean energy production both at the project and policy levels. Three 
projects that implement community renewable energy in different ways and therefore 
achieve different, yet related, goals are examined. The final two case studies analyze 
state-level policies that have implications for local clean energy energy production, one 
in Vermont and one in New Jersey.   
 In Fintry, Scotland, the issue of significant fuel poverty propelled a group of 
concerned citizens to explore the idea of hosting a large-scale wind project and 
negotiating partial ownership with the developer. The project that resulted provides 
Fintry with the ability to invest the money generated from its portion of the project back 
into energy-efficiency projects that allow community members to experience a 
considerably improved quality of life. 
 In Brighton, UK, a solar cooperative project was born out of one man’s desire to 
act in the face of climate-change. A small team of three individuals then faced numerous 
obstacles in their attempt to create a shareholder financed, owned and operated solar 
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array. Despite all of the challenges they faced, the project eventually was constructed and 
their goal of full financing and ownership by shareholders became a reality. 
 In Bayonne, NJ, things seemed considerably brighter in the wake of Superstorm 
Sandy than elsewhere in northern New Jersey. Demonstrating considerable foresight and 
planning, the municipality had, years prior to the storm, installed a solar array that 
included a dynamic inverter, enabling the array to switch from grid-tied to standalone 
mode in the event of a grid failure. As such, in the wake of an extended power outage in 
much of New Jersey, Bayonne was able to provide its residents with a safe, dry and warm 
place to seek shelter because of the ability of their solar array to power backup 
generators.  
 The two policies that were chosen are New Jersey Government Energy 
Aggregation and the Vermont Common Assets Trust. These two policies show how two 
different states have gone about implementing (or proposing) policies that deal with 
different aspects of renewable energy production. Government Energy Aggregation is a 
New Jersey state initiative that allows for local-level action on behalf of a community 
with the goal of saving residents money and providing them with electricity produced 
cleanly if they so choose. The Vermont Common Assets Trust is a concept that allows for 
state-level action to protect the environment for the current and future enjoyment of 
community members. Both policies empower a government entity to act on behalf of its 
constituents. Neither policy empowers the individual to act on his or her own behalf.  
 The policy case studies serve to show both what has been done and what is 
possible at the State level. The projects serve to show that, in the absence of Federal 
and/or State policy facilitating Community Renewable Energy – a small yet dedicated 
group of individuals will find a way to turn their visions of true community renewable 
energy into reality. Without policy support they will struggle and remain in the minority 
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but if they are dedicated enough and have sufficient resources, they will push forward 
and achieve their goals – setting an example for policy makers regarding what is possible 
when dedication and passion combine with the right policy tools.  
 From these five case studies, some of the best elements for encouraging true 
community renewable energy are extracted and used to form the basis of a discussion of 
policy choices open to New Jersey. Chapter 5, the resulting policy discussion, was 
reviewed by a panel of five experts representing different segments of the solar sector. 
Targeted questions, described in more detail in Chapter 6, were asked of the panel 
members in order to ensure that the feedback received was useful in further developing 
the policy ideas discussed therein. Feedback was received from each of the five experts 
and forms the basis of the policy development and summary provided in Chapter 6.  
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CHAPTER 4 
CASE STUDIES 
 
4.1 Introduction 
Three community renewable energy projects and two State level policies that to some 
degree facilitate such projects are presented in this Chapter. The project level case studies 
– Fintry, Scotland, Brighton, England, and Bayonne, New Jersey – set the stage for what 
is occurring both locally and elsewhere in the world with respect to successful 
community renewable energy projects. An analysis of these projects reveals challenges in 
planning, complicated negotiation of community compensation, as well as success in 
implementation and distribution of revenue. The two policy case studies - New Jersey 
Government Energy Aggregation and the Vermont Common Assets Trust - provide the 
framework for the tools necessary at the State level to allow for certain types of projects. 
All five case studies serve to expose how difficult it can be to craft comprehensive policy 
that encourages and facilitates the types of project that further public policy goals.  
  
4.2 Fintry, Scotland 
 
4.2.1 Community 
Fintry is a small village in central Scotland, located approximately twenty miles north of 
Glasgow and situated within the local government council area of Stirling. The 
community is nestled in a valley between the Campsie Fells and the Fintry Hills and 
boasts a population of approximately 800 people, or 333 properties. In this part of 
Scotland, being connected to the National Transmission System for gas supply is called 
being connected to “mains gas.” Fintry is not connected to mains gas and due to its 
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geographic location in a valley between hills; many of its 333 properties sit on high 
ground and are exposed to the harsh elements (FDT, et al., undated). Fuel costs have 
increased substantially over the last decade resulting in significant fuel poverty (FDT, et 
al., undated)
2
. 
 While Fintry’s geographic placement puts many of its residents at higher risk for 
exposure to extreme temperatures, this same characteristic also makes it highly desirable 
as a location for wind-farm development. Indeed, the frequent and steady winds that 
accompany such a geographic orientation are what drew wind-farm developers to the 
hills above Fintry. But when these same wind-farm developers cautiously approached the 
village with their plans to construct wind turbines high in the hills above the town, they 
were quite shocked by the reaction they received (Scott, 2009). The people of Fintry did 
not run the developers out of town, nor did they deploy any of the familiar “Not in My 
Backyard” (NIMBY) approach that renewable energy developers often encounter. 
Instead, from the very beginning, the people of Fintry engaged with the developer to find 
a way for the residents of the village to benefit from the project. 
 
4.2.2 Project 
Long before any wind-farm developers discovered the hills above Fintry as a potential 
development location, members of the community were already working toward the lofty 
goal of transitioning the village to a carbon-neutral sustainable community (FDT, 2009). 
In fact, four individuals in particular, referred to as the “Fintry Four” including Gordon 
Cowtan and David Howell, were proactively seeking to engage with a wind-farm 
developer when the project described herein was proposed to them by Falck Renewables. 
It turns out that in the case of Fintry, both the developer and the community were looking 
                                                          
2
 A household is said to be in fuel poverty when its members cannot afford to keep adequately warm at 
reasonable cost, given their income. (See http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Fuel_poverty) 
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to wind as a way to further each entity’s goal – Falck Renewables from a business 
standpoint and the people of Fintry from a sustainability standpoint, as well as a desire to 
achieve carbon-neutral status. As such in 2003, the Fintry Four officially formed Fintry 
Renewable Energy Enterprise (FREE) and drew up an extensive proposal for Falck 
Renewables that outlined what the community wanted to derive from the project. 
 The main element of the proposal that made it so innovative and community 
driven, is that FREE requested, and was given, an extra turbine to own. The developer’s 
original project concept included fourteen large-scale wind turbines, but the final design 
included a fifteenth turbine to be owned by FREE. The negotiation process for this 
arrangement culminated in a legal agreement between FREE and Falck Renewables 
which was signed in February of 2006 (FDT, 2009). Once FREE took over legal 
ownership of the fifteenth turbine, it evolved yet again into a new body, Fintry 
Development Trust (FDT), which then acquired charitable status and as such became 
legally able to disperse the revenue generated by the turbine. The FDT was created in 
June of 2007 and in May of the following year FDT received its first income from the 
operation of its turbine.  
 
4.2.3 Finances 
In most large-scale renewable energy projects (community or otherwise), the biggest 
limiting factor to success is usually the substantial up-front capital costs. In this particular 
case, FREE could never have afforded to purchase the fifteenth turbine outright from the 
developer. With no mains-gas access, and high levels of fuel poverty, the people of Fintry 
were not in a position to invest capital in such a project regardless of their desire to make 
Fintry carbon neutral/sustainable. This is where innovative thinking and the employment 
of community compensation emerged. The deal between FREE and Falck Renewables 
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acknowledged that the people of Fintry would have to sacrifice a certain degree of 
rural/scenic community character to host such a large wind farm. The landscape of their 
home would be changed considerably for the duration of the project (estimated to be at 
least 30 years) and all involved agreed that this sacrifice deserved compensation.   
 Falck Renewables agreed to the following proposal: FREE would mortgage the 
purchase of the fifteenth turbine from the company and pay back that mortgage out of the 
yearly profits generated by the turbine under community control. To simplify things, the 
arrangement allowed for FREE to own 1/15th of the profits of the entire project, rather 
than sort out which turbine exactly was the 15th and thus base FREE’s share of the 
profits on the production of that specific turbine. So FREE receives 1/15th of the profits 
generated from the project annually and out of that money Falck Renewables deducts the 
cost of the turbine’s construction, or the mortgage payment. After the wind farm had been 
operating for just over a year, it had already earned the villagers £140,000 (~225,000 US 
dollars). After the £2.5 million (~4,018,000 US dollars) mortgage is paid off, the annual 
profits for the village of Fintry are expected to be approximately £500,000 (~803,600 US 
dollars) per year (Scott, 2009).  
 
4.2.4 Revenue 
If the innovation and progressive thinking underlying this arrangement were to stop here, 
the Fintry wind-farm project would still be a great example of a community renewable 
energy project that not only engaged the locals in planning, but also directly provided 
benefits back to residents once constructed. In fact, the innovation and progressive 
thinking of this community renewable energy project does not stop here. It would have 
been very easy for FDT to simply dole out even shares of the revenue from this project to 
each resident or each household and allow the residents to use that money however they 
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saw fit – to pay bills, to educate their children, or to provide basic necessities like food 
and clothing for their families. Especially in light of the fuel poverty discussed earlier, 
one must assume that it would have been much easier and more popular to simply 
apportion the revenue to residents and allow those living in the harshest conditions to 
improve their state somewhat. But in spite of any pressure that may have existed to stop 
there, FDT remained focused on the larger goal of this project: to funnel the proceeds into 
energy- efficiency projects within the community thereby generating long-term 
sustainability impacts for residents. 
 With that goal in mind, FDT kicked off its first initiative utilizing revenue from 
the wind farm in 2008. The project’s goals were twofold: to reduce energy demand and to 
decrease fuel poverty. To accomplish these goals, the project set out to provide free 
insulation to all suitable homes in the community (FDT, 2009). “Suitable” homes were 
determined by doorstep surveys in which trained individuals acquired necessary 
information about each property and its energy use. Thermal imaging was utilized to 
expose where heat was being lost and reports were issued to each homeowner detailing 
the property’s energy consumption and emissions both before and after the insulation. 
Lastly, an educational program to promote energy efficiency was created for the primary 
school students of Fintry (FDT, 2009). 
 
4.2.5 Results 
Once the doorstep surveys were completed, the free insulation installed, and energy-
efficiency tips distributed, the final results of the project were analyzed. According to 
“Fintry Community Energy Project” a report compiled by FDT, Natural Scotland, the 
Scottish Government, and Energy Agency organizations in 2009, the results are 
impressive. “The average energy efficiency of households has increased by a third as a 
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result of the insulation measures. The community is producing 464 tons less carbon 
dioxide (CO2) each year as a direct result of the insulation. After insulation measures, 
35% of the households that received insulation and provided sufficient data are estimated 
to still be in fuel poverty – this is a reduction of 25%. From the data gathered, total 
household-energy consumption for the whole of Fintry has been estimated at 13.0 
gigawatt hours (GWh) per annum before the insulation project. Once completed, this will 
be reduced to an estimated 10.2 GWh per annum” (FDT, 2009). The Fintry-owned wind 
turbine generates approximately 7.5 GWh per annum, leaving Fintry with only 2.7 GWh 
per annum to account for before achieving its carbon-neutral goal. 
 
4.2.6 Next Steps 
The insulation project was only the first step in a larger plan to make Fintry carbon 
neutral. In 2009, FDT again utilized funds from the profits of the wind farm to make 
energy improvements to the community’s sports club. According to the FDT website, 
£5,634 (~9,055 US dollars) was spent to make the following improvements to the 
facility: low-energy lamps in changing rooms, toilets, corridors and the entrance area; 
passive infrared light sensors so that lights are switched off automatically when rooms 
and facilities are not in use; electric savers for water heaters and panel heaters; and low-
energy lamps and kits for the lighting in the bowling hall. Also in 2009, FDT contributed 
£2,186 (~3,513 US dollars) to purchasing new radiant heaters for Fintry’s Menzies Hall 
Facility. Future plans for the wind-turbine revenue funds include: a Phase 2 insulation 
plan, an initiative to insulate the park homes which were not part of the initial round, a 
program called “Fintry Community Wood Fuel”, and a plan called FEET (Fintry Energy 
Efficient Transport) (FDT, 2009).  
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4.2.7 The Fintry Model 
To make this overall scheme a reality, the Fintry Four started off with a rare degree of 
self-awareness regarding their circumstances, limitations, and opportunities with respect 
to the issue of fuel poverty in their community. Instead of wasting precious time and 
energy dwelling on their lack of access to mains gas, they instead organized internally, 
came up with written goals and objectives, and then proactively sought out a project that 
would improve their circumstances considerably. They advocated for their rights and 
what was owed to them, and did not back away from becoming active participants in 
determining their own fate. Through participation in a true community renewable energy 
project, they have improved their quality of life, reduced their impact on the environment, 
and empowered their community through the dissemination of information as power for 
change.  
 
4.3 Brighton, England 
Brighton, England is the major portion of the City now referred to as Brighton and Hove 
on the southern coast of Great Britain. The Brighton Energy Co-Op began with a 
fundamentally good idea and not much else. A person by the name of Will Cottrell was 
profoundly disappointed by the outcome of the Copenhagen Climate-change negotiations 
in December of 2009 and as such he decided that he wanted to do something about it, 
rather than waiting for others to act on his behalf (Hielscher, 2012). After learning about 
some of the first community renewable energy projects happening in the UK, as well as 
educating himself about the UK government’s plans to adopt a feed-in-tariff, an idea for a 
community-owned solar project in Brighton was born. Cottrell quickly discovered that he 
needed a team of individuals with varying backgrounds to turn this idea into reality. He 
held a public meeting to discuss his concept and as a result of this gathering added two 
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key players to his team: Damian Tow, an information-technology specialist, and Danni 
Cracker, a chartered (or certified) accountant. These three individuals would act as the 
core Brighton Energy Co-Op team and work closely together to turn their vision of doing 
something good for the environment and good for the community into a reality. 
 The road would not be smooth and the project would face numerous hurdles on its 
way to eventual completion. First up, the team resolved that it needed a strong business 
plan and decided upon the following project structure: a 350 kilowatt (kW) solar 
installation paid for by a £1 million (~1,607,200 US dollars) shareholder investment. 
Shareholders would pay the cost to purchase and install the panels and once constructed, 
they would own the system/s. Host sites would get a reduction in their energy costs for 25 
years by purchasing the clean energy back from the cooperative at a rate lower than that 
which they would otherwise pay their utility provider. Any revenue generated by the 
feed-in-tariff and sale of electricity would fund: “any maintenance & repairs required for 
the panels and associated equipment; the running costs of Brighton Energy Cooperative; 
payments into a sinking fund for replacement of the inverters; annual interest payments to 
investors (commencing at the end of year 3 of operations) as well as capital repayments; 
and finally fund low-carbon community projects” (Brighton Energy Cooperative, 
undated). 
 The aforementioned hurdles were plentiful and significant. Attracting 
shareholders to invest money in a business model that had never been tested with a team 
of people that had virtually no experience running such a project was difficult. Add in the 
fact that the UK government changed its feed-in-tariff rules numerous times during the 
course of the project-planning process, and the setbacks really began to mount. The UK 
government was progressively scaling back the size of projects that would be eligible for 
the feed-in-tariff as a way to limit the number of very large solar arrays. As a result, the 
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team needed to modify its business model quite a few times to reflect the changes in 
policy. Each time the feed-in tariff requirements were modified, the project model needed 
to incorporate more host sites with smaller arrays at each. Their original plan of one 350 
kW array eventually became a plan to install a total of up to 145 kW at three separate 
sites. This situation complicated matters because it required negotiations and permitting 
for three sites rather than one, adding time and funding pressure to an already stressed 
project. 
 To combat the significant negative impacts of the UK government’s feed-in tariff 
policy changes on the project, it is important to note that the team was actively engaged 
in lobbying efforts to exempt community renewable energy projects from some of the 
stricter regulations. During the course of the two-year planning and development process 
for Brighton Energy Co-Op’s solar project, the team tirelessly fought for community-
energy projects to be exempt from changes to the tariffs. They argued that the status of a 
community energy project as either a Community Benefit Society (CBS) or an Industrial 
Provident Society (IPS) should be proof enough of its non-commercial nature and could 
therefore, provide the basis for such an exemption (Hielscher, 2012). This type of a broad 
exemption for community renewable projects from feed-in tariff regulation changes has 
been widely debated in the UK but has not yet come to fruition. However, two smaller 
victories on the lobbying front were achieved. Community renewable projects in the UK 
are exempt from energy-efficiency requirements otherwise required for feed-in tariff 
eligibility. This provision allows these projects, first, to proceed without incurring the 
substantial extra costs associated with energy-efficiency improvements prior to solar 
installation. Second, community organizations are allowed to “fix freeze” the feed-in 
tariff levels after a building site agrees to host the solar array. Once the agreement 
between the solar landlord and Brighton Energy is finalized, the feed-in tariff level is 
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fixed for six months, again making it cheaper for these types of projects to proceed 
(Brighton Energy Cooperative, undated). These small legislative victories have helped 
the Brighton Energy Co-Op remain competitive in the solar market and have made 
community-owned projects more attractive to investors. 
 In the end, the success of the Brighton Energy Co-Op solar project and its 
business model came down to securing enough initial investment and shareholder 
contributions to fund the purchase and installation of the first set of panels. The team 
approached the task of engaging shareholders through share offers and held public 
meetings to get the word out about their project. During the first two years of fundraising, 
the team raised approximately £26,000 (~41,787 US dollars) from a small number of 
initial investors and used this money to get far enough in the planning process that an 
official share launch could be held.  
 The culmination of more than two years of hard work to get the message out 
occurred on May 16, 2012 when the team held its official share launch and explained the 
following business model to all those in attendance: “The Brighton Energy Co-op intends 
to install up to 145kWp of solar photovoltaic (PV) systems in order to generate clean 
electricity and financial return for members. We also aim to reinvest surplus income into 
other local renewable energy projects… Although we cannot guarantee any financial 
returns we intend to provide a return on investment to our members starting at 4% from 
the 1 July 2015, the end of the third year. Brighton Energy intends to retain ownership of 
these panels and receive an income via the Government’s Feed-in-Tariff scheme. Income 
will be used to administer Brighton Energy’s activities, fund withdrawal of shares and 
pay interest to members. Meanwhile, host buildings will receive discounted electricity; 
any excess will be sold to electricity provider Good Energy” (Brighton Energy 
Cooperative Share Offer Document). The share launch was a success and raised more 
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than £200,000 (~321,440 US dollars) from hundreds of community investors who 
believed in the project and believed in the team. Since that time, the team has installed 
solar systems at three sites for a combined generation of more than 130 kW–enough to 
power forty homes and save 1,085 tons of CO2 per year (Brighton Energy Cooperative, 
undated). 
 It is not particularly innovative or groundbreaking that three individuals would 
come together to build three solar arrays on three rooftop locations to generate clean and 
renewable energy. What is remarkable about this project is that three people set out to 
construct a solar project that would be entirely owned and operated by a community of 
shareholders. They set out to prove that generating renewable energy can be a good 
business model as well as the right thing to do for the environment and for residents. The 
Brighton Energy Co-Op model understands that local ownership of renewable energy has 
far reaching and lasting impacts. Community ownership “creates local dialogue and 
acceptance of renewables, it raises public awareness, it promotes cheaper and better 
technology through private investment, it is inherently democratic bringing more 
responsibility to the local level, it makes sustainable development understandable, and it 
gives people the opportunity to act for sustainable development” (Brighton Energy 
Cooperative, undated). 
 The success of this project illustrates a number of points with respect to local 
clean energy production. First, it shows that local-level renewable energy projects can 
make sound business sense and compete successfully in the marketplace alongside 
projects that lack any community involvement. Second, it exposes how critical 
government policy is in determining the long-term success or failure of a local renewable 
energy project and leads to the conclusion that if governments want to promote these 
types of projects they need to explore ways to help stabilize them by providing as much 
 
 
31 
 
regulatory certainty as possible. Finally, it demonstrates that people are interested in 
supporting projects that they believe in when the goals of the project line up with their 
own personal philosophies. The hundreds of community investors that contributed to 
making this project happen did so because they believed in the project, had confidence in 
the team, and wanted to act in their own self-interest to protect their environment rather 
than waiting for someone else to act on their behalf.  
 
4.4 Bayonne, New Jersey 
A local-level solar installation with the ability to provide backup emergency power to the 
general public in the event of a grid failure is a project that simultaneously achieves the 
goals of mitigation, adaptation, resilience, and sustainable development. A solar 
installation by nature achieves the goals of mitigation by reducing the GHG emissions of 
the facility it serves by providing it with clean and renewable power. It is true that a solar 
installation connected to the grid and “net-metered” does not in fact supply the actual 
facility that hosts the installation with the clean and renewable electrons generated by the 
solar system. Instead, the array sends those electrons into the local utility distribution 
system (or “grid”) and then the host facility draws different electrons from the grid to 
power its operations. All the same, the facility that houses the renewable energy source is 
contributing to a reduced overall demand for electrons generated by fossil-fuel 
combustion and therefore contributes to a reduction in GHG emissions. During months 
when the solar array produces more energy than the building consumes, the net effect is a 
drastically reduced electricity bill for the facility housing the net metered solar array. 
Provided this cost savings does not spur the facility in question to consume more total 
electrons, this outcome achieves the goals of climate-change mitigation (Owen, 2012).  
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 How then does a net-metered solar array contribute to a local community’s goal 
of adapting to climate-change impacts or building its resilience? This is where the 
potential for backup generation during grid failure becomes critical. Traditionally, when a 
solar array is installed it is either tied into the grid or it is not tied into the grid (otherwise 
referred to as a “standalone” system). If it is not tied into the grid and therefore functions 
as a standalone system, it requires expensive battery storage capacity to collect and hold 
the power generated but not needed from moment to moment. Most solar installations are 
grid connected so that they do not require battery storage and can instead send any power 
generated in excess of the facility’s needs back into the distribution system for use by 
others. This also enables the owner of the array to be compensated for this contribution of 
clean energy to the grid at a retail rate. While this set up (commonly referred to as “net 
metering”) is usually much more lucrative than the alternative of installing storage 
capacity and not receiving compensation for electricity provided to the grid, it does have 
one major drawback.  
When a solar array is solely grid-tied, it is vulnerable to the failure of the grid. In 
other words, when the grid fails, the connection between the solar system and the grid is 
severed. As such, in the example of an extreme storm event that results in a widespread 
grid failure, any solar installation tied into the portion of the grid that fails, will also stop 
working. To be clear, the panels themselves will continue to generate power but all grid-
tied systems are mandated to be installed with an inverter switch that automatically shuts 
off the connection between the array and the grid in the event of grid failure and 
automatically turns it back on when the grid resumes function. This inverter switch is 
mandated under the National Electrical Code requirements called “anti-islanding” and a 
grid-tied solar array lacking this feature will fail electrical inspection. It is a feature that 
works automatically when the system senses grid failure and it prevents the solar array 
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from feeding electrons into the grid during these times in order to protect utility workers 
from unwittingly working on “live” wires (C. Bosket, personal communication, 
November, 2012). As such, even if the storm has passed and the sun is shining brightly, if 
the grid stays down, the solar array will remain inoperative. Only when grid function is 
restored will the solar system again feed electrons to the grid. This severely limits the 
adaptive capacity of a purely grid-tied solar installation.  
 However, there is a way to create a hybrid system between the two classic models 
described above – grid-tied versus standalone. With one simple added inverter switch, 
often called a “dynamic inverter,” a grid-tied solar installation can become standalone in 
the event of grid failure and direct the flow of power generated by the solar panels away 
from the grid entirely and instead toward a backup storage unit like a generator, a battery, 
or an electric vehicle (C. Bosket, personal communication, November, 2012). In this way, 
the solar array can continue to function even when the grid has failed. This makes the 
solar installation not only a mitigation tool by virtue of the GHG emissions it achieves, 
but also an adaptation tool based upon its ability to provide backup power in the event of 
a grid failure. If such grid failures are the result of climate change-induced severe storm 
events, then the hybrid solar array discussed above also contributes directly to the 
resilience of the community that installed it.   
 One such community is Bayonne, New Jersey. As discussed earlier, in 2004, well 
in advance of Superstorm Sandy, the municipality of Bayonne installed a solar array with 
the dynamic inverter technology described above at its Midtown Community School, a 
designated emergency evacuation center for the City. As such, when Superstorm Sandy 
made landfall in October 2012, the community of Bayonne was able to rely on the energy 
generated by the solar panels to power diesel generators at the school to keep the lights 
on. This allowed the school to function in the capacity of an emergency evacuation 
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center, as planned, providing shelter, food, and water to the residents of Bayonne during 
the extended period of time that the utility was unable to deliver power due to grid 
failure. 
 
4.5 New Jersey Government Energy Aggregation 
There are four main electric distribution companies (EDCs) in New Jersey, commonly 
referred to as “utilities”. The four EDCs serving customers in the state with electricity 
are: Jersey Central Power and Light (JCP&L), Orange & Rockland Electric (RECO), 
Public Service Electric & Gas (PSE&G) and Atlantic City Electric (ACE). Prior to the 
Electric Discount and Energy Competition Act (EDECA), which deregulated the New 
Jersey electricity industry in 1999, the EDCs were responsible for both the generation and 
transmission of power to customers in their territories. After EDECA, the services EDCs 
provided were unbundled and placed into four different categories: generation, 
transmission, distribution and energy services.
3
 The generation sector was deregulated 
which introduced competition into the market when the EDCs were no longer the only 
entities generating power. On the generation side, deregulation ushered into the state 
many third party-suppliers (TPSs) of energy. The transmission and distribution sectors 
remain regulated.  
 The effect of deregulation on the market is that customers – both residential and 
commercial – can shop around for the most inexpensive price for energy. If an EDC does 
not provide the cheapest rate, a customer can choose a TPS that offers a better rate. The 
EDC still transmits and delivers the power via its transmission system, but the customer 
is purchasing the energy from a different supplier. This allows for the customer to make a 
decision about which provider to choose based on the criteria he considers most 
                                                          
3
 See http://www.njelectricity.org/ 
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important: price, whether the power comes from renewable sources, trust in a particular 
company, and so forth. Yet as of 2012, the New Jersey Board of Public Utilities (NJBPU) 
reported that only 11% of New Jersey residents had switched to a TPS for power and 
instead remained with their EDC for both supply and transmission. The reasons for not 
switching to a TPS vary. Some customers simply do not know that the option to shop 
around is open to them. Others understand that the option is open to them but choose not 
to act upon it because they feel insecure in their knowledge of what switching to a TPS 
will really mean for them. Potential customers remain skeptical of the claims advertised 
by TPSs to provide the same reliable power at a reduced cost and they fear entering into a 
contract that could actually end up costing them more money. Whatever the reason, most 
New Jersey electricity customers have been staying with their EDC for energy supply 
despite deregulation.  
 EDECA, the legislation that deregulated the energy sector in New Jersey, also 
ushered in a subsequent piece of legislation called the Government Energy Aggregation 
Act of 2003 (L. 2003, c. 24). This Act “authorizes municipalities and/or counties of New 
Jersey to establish Government Energy Aggregation (GEA) programs after passing an 
ordinance or a resolution. A GEA program allows municipalities, working alone or in a 
group, to aggregate the energy requirements of residential, commercial and municipal 
accounts so that the GEA program can purchase energy supply from non-utility sellers of 
electricity and gas supply (Third Party Suppliers or TPS) at prices lower than the average 
utility price, with the possibility of added benefits such as higher renewable energy 
content.”4   
 In effect, this legislation allows a municipality to harness the purchasing power of 
its residents and businesses to procure the lowest possible rate from a TPS. The intent of 
                                                          
4
 See http://nj.gov/bpu/pdf/energy/NJ_Gov_Energy_Aggregation_Summary.pdf 
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this legislation was to increase competition within the electricity sector in New Jersey. 
Understanding that individual residents and businesses might be hesitant to deal with 
associated risk and perceived hassle of switching to a TPS, the legislation provided the 
municipality with the necessary authority to make the switch on behalf of its constituents. 
After all, the potential for savings seemed far greater if the municipality aggregated all of 
the customers within its jurisdiction together and negotiated a significantly cheaper rate 
on everyone’s behalf. It makes sense to assume that a TPS would offer one entity 
representing hundreds if not thousands of new customers a better rate than a single 
customer might receive. Additionally, if an individual’s municipal government passed the 
required ordinance and aggregated on his behalf, then all of the “hassle” associated with 
switching would be removed from the individual customer and placed on the 
municipality. This might alleviate the concerns discussed earlier.  
And yet still, despite the passage of the GEA, few municipalities have been 
capitalizing on the opportunity to aggregate on behalf of their residents and businesses 
and procure cheaper electricity rates. To date, only two municipalities in New Jersey 
have passed the required local ordinance to aggregate and then subsequently awarded 
contracts to a third-party supplier – Plumstead Township and the Township of Toms 
River.
5
 Plumstead was the first community to award a contract to a third-party supplier 
and the town expected to save its residents over $400,000 in the first year. Toms River 
followed this lead and expects to save its residents $4,000,000 annually. 
 If other municipalities follow the example set by Plumstead and Toms River, it 
will be interesting to see whether the anticipated cost savings become a reality. Also 
compelling will be the impact that additional community aggregations will have on the 
associated EDCs. One might assume that as other municipalities aggregate on behalf of 
                                                          
5
 See http://njccea.org/ 
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their residents, and thereby remove their business (for supply) from the EDCs and 
transfer it to TPSs, this could have a significant negative impact on the EDCs in question. 
One thing is certain, if the first two municipalities to try this are successful, others will 
follow. Local governments in New Jersey are suffering considerably due to decreasing 
budgets and increasing demand for services. Any place a municipality can see a cost 
savings is certain to pique the interest of local officials.  
 But is it enough – from a community renewable energy perspective – to 
encourage government energy aggregation at the local level if the only benefit of such an 
arrangement is financial? What about the source of the power and how it is generated? In 
order for GEA to really be used as a vehicle for community renewable energy production, 
the aggregating locality must also consider the source of the power it is purchasing and 
factor renewable energy into its decision making.  
 
4.6 Vermont Common Assets Trust 
The “tragedy of the commons” is a theory first articulated by Garrett Hardin (1968). His 
classic example of the phenomenon depicts a large open field in which anyone can allow 
his cow to graze without paying a fee or individually owning any portion of the parcel. 
Hardin explained that in the absence of a strict regulatory regime, people will overexploit 
the resource to further their own self-interest. Farmers will place more and more cows 
onto the commons in an attempt to reap the benefits of getting something for nothing, but 
this will eventually lead to the total destruction of the land at which point it will be 
useless to all. Hardin cautions that without proper mechanisms to place value on the land 
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and regulate its use based on the benefits it provides to the farmers, humans will always 
undermine the resource until it is gone entirely.
6
 
 It is widely argued that this tragedy of the commons is not just a theory, but a 
phenomenon that is in fact playing out globally with respect to those environmental 
assets for which access is open to all without proper controls. Global fishing stocks are 
being depleted much faster than they are able to naturally replenish. It is estimated that if 
this trend continues and current levels of commercial fishing are not curtailed, oceanic 
fisheries could be entirely wiped out by 2048 (Worm et al. 2006). Unfortunately, global 
fishing stocks are not the only example of such extreme exploitation. Supplies of non-
renewable energy sources are being depleted much faster than they are being replaced 
with renewable alternatives (Farley, 2011). To compound matters even further, such 
extreme resource extraction generates waste much more quickly than the environment 
can absorb and, as a result, discarded materials accumulate at the same time space for 
disposal becomes increasingly scarce. The effects of over-consumption, extreme resource 
depletion, and significant waste accumulation cannot continue indefinitely without 
disastrous consequences (Farley, 2011).  
 Certain populations are already feeling the effects of the phenomenon discussed 
above, most notably the poor. Paradoxically, it is not generally the poor who are rapidly 
consuming the world’s limited resources, it is the wealthy. The wealthiest minority is 
depleting global resources at a rapid pace and those currently suffering the most are the 
poor, although eventually the effects will affect everyone. The question becomes, what 
can be done before it is too late? Is there any politically feasible way to curtail the perfect 
storm of resource depletion, over-consumption, and waste accumulation before the story 
ends in same way Hardin outlined in 1968?  
                                                          
6
 See http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Tragedy_of_the_commons  
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 The state of Vermont is attempting to do just that. Vermont State House Bill 385 
(identical to the 2007 State Senate Bill 44) proposes the creation of a Vermont Common 
Assets Trust (VCAT) which would “make certain resources the common property of all 
Vermonters” (Farley, 2011). Based on the idea that the people of Vermont own certain 
common resources and should be compensated for their depletion/extraction/use, VCAT 
attempts to assign a value or price to their use in an attempt to bring resource 
consumption and regeneration back into balance. Relating back to Hardin’s example of 
the cows grazing on common land free of charge, would the same eventual destruction of 
the resource occur if a price was assigned to use of that land? And if that price fluctuated 
based on the condition of the resource and how much protection from overgrazing it 
required, could a balance eventually be struck between the appropriate use of the site and 
the appropriate protection of it for use by future generations? 
 That is the goal of the VCAT policy. And while VCAT is the first of its kind with 
respect to setting up a trust that assigns prices to a variety of environmental assets, the 
general concept of assigning ownership of public goods to the public is not new. In fact, 
the State of Alaska has been managing its mineral rights in this manner for decades (and 
other states have similar—though perhaps less prominent—programs). The Alaska 
Permanent Fund (APF) was established in 1976 and every year it disperses up to $2,000 
to each resident of the state based upon the concept that the people of Alaska own the 
mineral rights contained within the state and should therefore be compensated for their 
extraction.
7
 Similar structures exist to manage oil resources in, for example, Abu Dhabi 
and Norway. What makes VCAT unique is that it attempts to manage numerous common 
assets owned by the people of Vermont rather than just one resource, like oil.  
                                                          
7
 See http://pfd.alaska.gov/DivisionInfo/HistoricalTimeline 
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 Critical to the VACT model is an understanding of the concept of economic rent. 
Economic rent is defined as “all unearned income from ownership of a resource, from a 
monopoly, from scarcity, or any other reason resulting in unearned excess profits not due 
to work, risk, or enterprise” (State of Commons, Tomales Bay Institute, 2003). This 
means that any excess profits made after the cost of resource extraction, taking into 
account a normal rate of return, would be considered economic rent. In the VCAT model, 
revenue from economic rent on common assets would either be allocated to the 
restoration and protection of the resource, or it would be disbursed to the citizens of 
Vermont, as in the case of Alaska Permanent Fund. Either way, Vermonters would 
benefit from the value of the economic rent by either having the resources that they own 
protected, or at least enjoying compensation for their depletion/extraction. Those who 
support VCAT as a vehicle for long-term sustainability would promote the allocation of 
the rent funds to protection of the resource over the direct payment of funds to citizens, 
which could have the unintended consequence of promoting further overconsumption, 
one of the factors leading to the need for VCAT in the first place. 
 A novel way that VCAT can be applied to the nascent renewable energy industry 
is by exploring the possibility of wind or solar ray rent (Skalka, 2008). Wind is not much 
different than a resource like groundwater or oil; it can be exploited for personal gain 
without compensating those who own it–arguably the citizens of Vermont. The only real 
difference between wind/solar rays and resources like groundwater or oil is that wind and 
solar rays are renewable. But does this mean that they are not owned by the people of 
Vermont the same way non-renewable resources are? Why repeat the same mistakes 
made with other resource-dependent industries in the past by allowing renewable energy 
developers free access to the wind and sun without sharing any of the accrued economic 
rent with the public? Utilizing VCAT in this manner could provide a way to take 
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renewable energy projects that lack a community benefit and force them to distribute at 
least a modest portion of their profits (those which fall into the economic rent category) 
to members of the community that hosts the wind mills or solar panels and suffers an 
associated loss of community character, view shed quality, and/or open space.  
 Returning to Hardin’s depiction of the tragedy of the commons, it is interesting to 
note that significant research has revealed alternate viewpoints on this issue. Nobel Prize 
winning scientist Elinor Ostrum argued that government intervention and assignment of 
property value is not always the most effective way of correcting the problem of the 
commons. While she agrees that sometimes government intervention is the only way to 
control rampant exploitation of resources, she also contributed a significant amount of 
research showing that sometimes tribal and local communities, when left to their own 
devices, develop better ways of controlling this phenomenon on their own without 
intervention from higher levels of government (Tierney, 2009).  
 If Ostrom is correct, it becomes even more critical that decision making at the 
local level is informed and targeted to achieve public-policy goals.  
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CHAPTER 5 
POLICY DISCUSSION 
 
Increasing community resilience during a period of climate-change should be a 
paramount policy objective for New Jersey. Current literature suggests that most 
government action with respect to climate-change is happening at the local level. The 
production of and access to clean renewable energy is a fundamental part of resiliency. 
Without access to renewable energy at the local level (also referred to as “distributed” 
renewable energy) communities in New Jersey will no doubt suffer the same effects—or 
worse—as they did in the aftermath of Superstorm Sandy when the next storm/weather 
event hits the state. And yet, public policy in the United States, at both the state and 
federal levels incentivizing the production of renewable energy, is focused primarily on 
the private sector. With respect to solar energy production in particular, it is understood 
that without robust state and federal inducements—the most generous of which are not 
available to municipalities and counties—the cost of solar technology and installation 
would be too great an obstacle to overcome. It is often only with these incentives that 
solar projects become cost effective and even revenue generating over the long term.  
 In addition to the lack of access to incentives that could allow communities to 
install solar themselves, municipal governments in New Jersey are finding it difficult to 
control where private developers install solar projects in their communities. A series of 
steps taken by the state to jumpstart the solar industry and create jobs has produced the 
unintended consequence of tying the hands of local communities with respect to the 
siting of solar projects. New Jersey is often referred to as a “home rule” state meaning 
that the state, for the most part, delegates land-use decisions to local municipalities. New 
Jersey allows each community to develop zoning and master plans in accordance with 
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state land-use laws. As referred to earlier, in an attempt to ignite the solar industry in 
New Jersey, on November 20, 2009, Governor Christie signed into law the designation of 
solar as an “inherently beneficial use.” The impact of this initiative has been—and 
continues to be—significant. In essence, in the absence of a municipal solar siting 
ordinance, this legislation frees a developer from having to acquire a use variance when 
solar is proposed in a zone where it is not a designated permitted use. As such, the onus is 
on each municipality to proactively adopt a solar siting ordinance to exert control over 
where solar projects are situated in their communities. This has been especially difficult 
for farming communities in the southern part of the state. Often times, solar developers 
seek out farmland as ideal for conversion to solar for economic reasons. Questions about 
the efficacy of this strategy becomes especially apparent when contrasted with the fact 
that New Jersey has approximately 800 million square feet of industrial rooftop space
8
 
and only needs roughly 300 million square feet of this area to accommodate a sufficient 
amount of solar-generating capacity to fulfill the entire solar portion of the state’s 
renewable portfolio standard (RPS).
9
 
 The designation of solar as inherently beneficial combined with generous 
incentives has spurred the creation of a vibrant private solar sector in New Jersey. 
However, there has not been similar progress facilitating the responsible and successful 
installation of solar at the local level. Due in large part to the ineligibility of government 
entities to qualify for federal incentives, municipalities have not been able to develop 
solar as easily as private entities. As of August 2013, there were 22,569 solar projects 
                                                          
8
 http://www.njfuture.org/2012/05/18/solar-testimony. 
 
9
 New Jersey's renewable portfolio standard (RPS)—one of the most aggressive in the United States–
requires each supplier/provider serving retail customers in the state to procure 22.5% of the electricity it 
sells in New Jersey from qualifying renewables by 2021 (“energy year” 2021 runs from June 2020 – May 
2021). In addition, the standard also contains a separate solar specific provision which requires suppliers 
and providers to procure at least 4.1% of sales from qualifying solar electric generation facilities by Energy 
Year 2028 (see http://www.dsireusa.org/incentives/incentive.cfm?Incentive_Code=NJ05R). 
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installed in New Jersey and of those only about 546 (or 2.42%) were public projects.
10
 
Additionally, as discussed above, municipalities face difficulty regulating where within 
their boundaries privately funded solar arrays are sited. The result is that in New Jersey, 
local governments are not benefiting from solar energy production as much as the private 
sector is and they are suffering the negative repercussions from policies which severely 
limit their control over siting private solar projects.  
 Compounding things further, community compensation for hosting renewable 
energy projects is not a common occurrence in New Jersey. Elsewhere in the world, 
however, it has become increasingly common for renewable energy developers to engage 
communities in the planning process very early, site their projects in locations found to 
be acceptable by local residents, and even distribute a portion of the proceeds back to the 
community as compensation for hosting the project (see Chapter 4). For example, in 
Fintry, Scotland, a wind developer, after assessing various locations for project potential, 
approached community members with a plan to install a large-scale wind farm. The 
residents of Fintry had struggled for years with issues stemming from systemic fuel 
poverty.
11
 As a result, when approached by the wind developer, they saw an opportunity 
to improve their standard of living by negotiating compensation for hosting the wind 
installation. After a series of lengthy discussions, it was agreed that the originally 
proposed fourteen-turbine installation would be increased by one turbine to fifteen in 
total, with the community of Fintry owning the fifteenth turbine and all associated profits 
generated by it. In this way, the community has added an annual revenue stream, the 
                                                          
10
 New Jersey Board of Public Utilities, Office of Clean Energy. 
 
11
 A household is said to be in fuel poverty when its members cannot afford to keep adequately warm at 
reasonable cost, given their income. (See http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Fuel_poverty) 
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funds from which are locally reinvested in the form of residential energy-efficiency 
improvements that directly combat fuel poverty.  
 The Fintry model illuminates the fact that New Jersey, while progressive in many 
ways, lags behind in terms of innovation when it comes to community renewable energy. 
Community compensation for hosting renewable energy projects is not something that is 
occurring very often, if at all in New Jersey. Also as discussed, community involvement 
in the planning process for private projects, as well as proactive action on the part of local 
government to install public projects, are also lacking. And yet municipal governments 
have a key role to play in acting in the best interests of residents with respect to increased 
resiliency in the face of climate-change. As the climate-changes and weather-related 
events like Superstorm Sandy become more frequent, local governments will face 
increased pressure to provide basic services to residents who are left without power for 
prolonged periods of time or even forced to evacuate their homes. As such, local facilities 
that are large enough to act as public shelters for community members during an 
emergency should be targeted for distributed energy projects that are equipped to 
function even in the event of grid failure.  
 A privately owned solar array (regardless of whether it is grid-tied or net metered) 
is not going to help the public at large when the power grid fails. Even a private solar 
array that utilizes a dynamic inverter to allow it to continue operating when the grid fails 
will not benefit others beyond the owner of the array unless the owner chooses to 
somehow share that access to backup power with others.
12
 It is only when a solar project 
(with a dynamic inverter installed) is owned and operated by a public entity that it can be 
                                                          
12
 The presence of a dynamic inverter allows a facility with a solar array to continue to power a location 
even though electrical grid power from the electric utility is no longer present. In the event of grid failure, 
the dynamic inverter will automatically sense the lost connection to the grid, disconnect the system from 
the grid, and force the distributed generator to power an alternate source such as a battery, generator, or 
electric vehicle. 
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counted on to provide backup power to the local community in the event of an 
emergency. To this point, of the 546 public solar projects installed in New Jersey today, 
only a small fraction are actually owned and operated by the public entity itself. The 
majority of these projects are instead structured through a power-purchase agreement 
(PPA), meaning that the solar array itself is owned and operated by a third party that rents 
space (rooftop or land) from the public entity to host the array. Generally speaking, this is 
one of the few ways that a local government can make a solar project work since often 
times local governments lack the capital required to own and operate their own array. As 
such, this type of arrangement is successful in generating a new revenue stream for the 
local entity hosting the solar array via the rent payments they receive, but it should not be 
mistaken for a project that will necessarily increase the resiliency of the local entity. 
Unless provisions for resiliency are explicitly written into the contract associated with a 
PPA, public ownership of the array is a critical element in resiliency planning.  
 New Jersey should prioritize solar projects that produce the dual benefit of 
generating clean renewable energy that can also be counted on to support the public in 
the case of an emergency. It is necessary to be creative to find ways that both allow local 
communities to install their own solar arrays with dynamic inverters and thereby increase 
their resiliency as well as to identify strategies that give them more control in deciding 
where private solar projects will be sited within their communities. Additionally, it is 
important to open up the conversation in New Jersey about community compensation for 
hosting renewable energy projects. This discussion needs to address compensation with 
respect to the communities that host these projects as well as compensation for the natural 
resources they use/consume. As highlighted by the State of Vermont’s legislation 
proposing a Vermont Common Assets Trust (VCAT), there is no reason why New Jersey 
could not impose a cost associated with the use of the state’s natural resources, including 
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the sun. If solar developers, for example, were required to pay a small tax on their use of 
a natural resource (the sun), the money generated could help restore parts of the state’s 
ecosystem that have been compromised for decades by overconsumption and extraction 
of resources without payment. Just because sunlight is a renewable resource does not 
mean its use could not be taxed to provide for the greater good of restoring New Jersey’s 
environment for future generations to enjoy.  
 Funds generated from compensation for resource consumption (i.e., a sun tax 
based on the VCAT model) could also be combined with funds generated from 
community compensation for hosting private renewable energy projects (based loosely on 
the Fintry model) to provide the capital necessary for local governments to install their 
own solar arrays either on rooftops or land that they own. As it stands currently in New 
Jersey, when an entity installs a solar array—under certain circumstances—they are 
eligible to receive solar renewable energy credits (SRECs) commensurate with the energy 
they produce. Those SRECs are then sold by the owner of the array and the money 
generated is used to recover some of the cost of installing the system. The SRECs are 
purchased in the marketplace by energy suppliers that are required to procure them – or 
pay a solar alternative compliance payment – under state law. Those energy suppliers 
pass the cost of purchasing SRECs on to their customers—which amounts to anyone in 
New Jersey who pays a bill for electric service. As such, it is the general populace of the 
state that is supporting the local SREC market.  
Charging solar developers a small tax to utilize the natural resource of the sun, 
plus requiring them to compensate the host community and then having those funds 
reinvested in the community could allow local governments to build their own solar 
arrays. The government-owned equipment would be outfitted with the necessary 
hardware to function and provide backup power in the event of an emergency. This type 
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of arrangement would be an innovative way to channel the money initially invested by 
the general public via SREC charges on their electric bills to resiliency projects that they 
(the public) could then count on in the event of an emergency. In this way a small portion 
of the money would eventually come full circle back to the general public, while most of 
it would still remain with the solar developer to ensure continued activity in the industry. 
As it stands, the ratepayers that financially support the SREC market benefit tangentially 
from cleaner air via increased penetration of renewables, but the funding mechanism 
described above would take that tangential benefit and turn it into something much more 
tangible. 
 Another way to accomplish the same goal would be to tailor extra incentives to 
private solar initiatives that have the potential to achieve similar public policy objectives. 
For example, projects that might be eligible for extra incentives would be those that  
1) are located in close proximity to municipal facilities; 2) install dynamic inverters; and 
3) propose emergency-response plans that allow a nearby municipal facility to tap into 
the backup power generated by the array in the event of a prolonged power outage. 
Another idea would be to narrow the universe of projects that are eligible to receive 
SRECs to only those that incorporate elements of public resiliency into their project 
design.  
New Jersey has set aspirational targets for solar energy production and to date has 
surpassed these goals (and even recently passed the one-gigawatt benchmark of solar 
energy installed within the state).
13
 The state no longer needs to be as concerned about 
creating the solar energy industry in New Jersey—it is here. Now is the time to target 
incentives to projects that fulfill public-policy goals of increased local level resiliency. 
                                                          
13
 One gigawatt of electricity can power roughly 143,000 homes (http://www.seia.org/policy/solar-
technology/photovoltaic-solar-electric/whats-megawatt). 
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Movement in this direction will require private solar developers to work in partnership 
with local governments to better prepare for the adverse effects of climate-change. This 
type of public-private partnership could help direct the solar industry in New Jersey to 
very specific projects that satisfy policy objectives while still maintaining enough activity 
in the industry to keep developers satisfied.  
 Additional benefits could emerge from such public-private solar partnerships in 
New Jersey. Due in part to the problems that municipalities face when trying to control 
where solar projects are developed, the local approval process can be difficult for the 
developer. However, if the paradigm for these kinds of projects shifts from one where 
developers choose sites based heavily on cost concerns to one where they work in 
partnership with the local government to choose sites based on master planning, the 
permitting process might become more streamlined and less cumbersome. This could 
save the developer considerable time and money which is often expended wading through 
a lengthy and often contentious local permitting process. Additionally, this type of a 
partnership could help municipalities implement smart-growth strategies by enabling 
them to target parcels within their community that make sense for solar instead of waiting 
for the developer to choose the site and being left in a reactionary mode.  
 The solar cooperative in Brighton, England, struggled for years to get off the 
ground due in large part to issues surrounding approval and permitting at both the local 
and regional levels. The project was originally planned as one large installation at a 
single location but by the time it was constructed it had transformed into three smaller 
arrays at three separate locations, due in some degree to government push back and 
changing regulations with respect to large-scale solar projects in the UK. These changes 
in design undoubtedly cost the developer considerable time and money. This example 
underscores the potential benefits of working with government agencies at every level 
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early in the process to ensure an acceptable degree of regulatory certainty for the 
developer and to engender a comfort level from the agencies involved that the project is 
one they can support. 
 As discussed earlier, New Jersey has a long history of home rule vis-à-vis 
municipal control over land-use planning. Also, the local level appears to be where most 
climate-change (adaption and/or mitigation) planning is occurring. As such, a clear 
opportunity is emerging to move the solar industry in New Jersey forward in a way that 
makes communities in the state stronger and better prepared for the challenges of the 
future. When faced with an emergency situation, residents in New Jersey will always 
look to their local officials for help and assistance. However, municipal and county 
budgets are shrinking by the day, limiting their ability to respond quickly and sufficiently 
to pressing needs.  
There are ways to work with the existing structure of the solar industry in New 
Jersey to make it easier for local governments to install solar arrays that they can count 
on to provide power in the event of emergency. To implement the necessary changes, the 
state needs a strong policy that brings solar developers together with local government 
and encourages them to work together to plan smarter solar installations that are mutually 
beneficial. Additionally, New Jersey needs to comprehensively address the issue of 
community compensation for hosting these projects and to develop a mechanism to 
utilize the funds generated to help public entities increase their resilience. If the policy is 
crafted successfully, New Jersey can remain a leader in solar policy and at the same time 
become a leader in local resiliency planning efforts. 
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CHAPTER 6 
POLICY DEVELOPMENT AND SUMMARY 
 
6.1 Expert Panel Composition and Coordination 
The expert panel that provided comment on Chapter 5 is comprised of five individuals 
representing a diverse cross section of views from different sectors of the solar field. 
Scott Hunter is the Administrator of the Office of Clean Energy at the New Jersey Board 
of Public Utilities (NJBPU). Katie Brown recently completed a fellowship with the 
United States Environmental Protection Agency (USEPA) working specifically on EPA's 
RE-Powering America's Land Initiative. Katie also has previous professional experience 
in the solar industry. Pam Frank is Vice President at Gabel and Associates in New Jersey 
where she manages the firm’s efforts related to the development of renewable energy, 
advanced technology, and energy efficiency projects. Mark Warner is Director of Energy 
at Sustainable Jersey and at the Sustainability Institute at The College of New 
Jersey. Finally, Jonathan Cloud has considerable experience in the energy field and is 
also a fellow at the Fairleigh Dickinson University Institute for Sustainable Enterprise 
(ISE). 
 Each member of the panel was provided a copy of Chapter 5 and asked to provide 
a one page response document. The following five questions were provided for 
consideration:  1) Putting aside the issue of what is currently politically feasible in New 
Jersey; do you think that the proposed policy and/or mechanism, if implemented, would 
be successful in achieving its goals?; 2) If successfully implemented, from the 
perspective of the constituent group you represent, would such a policy be of benefit?;  
3) Where do you see deficiencies in the proposed policy?; 4) Does the policy, as 
presented, inspire any of your own ideas with respect to how it might be expanded upon 
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or pushed further to accomplish its goals?; and finally 5) Can you foresee any unintended 
consequences of such a policy if implemented? 
 
6.2 Expert Panel Responses and Policy Development 
The responses of the panel can be generally characterized as follows: while the feedback 
received from the panel was diverse in nature, there were certain common elements 
echoed by several of the experts which provided the basis for constructive criticism. Not 
surprisingly, the experts representing the solar industry did not endorse the idea of taxing 
the solar development community in New Jersey. The rationale provided for this opinion 
was largely based on the fact that solar energy is more expensive to produce than 
traditional fossil fuel-derived types of energy and thus already sits at a disadvantage 
competitively – especially in light of the recent and precipitous drop in the price of 
natural gas. As such, the perverse impact of further handicapping the solar industry via a 
tax was highlighted as a significant drawback. Additionally, it was mentioned by one 
expert that taxing a renewable energy producer in order to right the wrongs, so to speak, 
of traditional fossil fuel-energy producers was not deemed to be particularly fair. 
 Additionally, the idea of tailoring extra incentives (via SREC weighting) to those 
projects that provide local-level resilience was met with resistance by several panelists. 
The solar industry in New Jersey was constructed on the basis of market-based principles 
and it was highlighted that further regulatory interference with the market, via SREC 
multipliers or other SREC weighting mechanisms, would only serve to diminish investors 
confidence as well as their level of regulatory certainty. This could drive investment in 
the industry downward which would in turn drive solar installation in New Jersey 
downward. Instead, the panel almost unanimously favored that any attempt to encourage 
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public solar projects that foster resiliency be done in such a way that works in concert 
with the current market-based structure, not counter to it.  
 These suggestions lead naturally into a discussion of public ownership of solar 
and whether, in fact, it is critical for a public entity to actually own the solar array if 
resiliency benefits are expected. Two individuals on the panel have either past or present-
day experience as members of the New Jersey solar development industry. From this 
perspective, they both emphasized that local-level ownership of the solar array is not 
critical for resiliency benefits to be derived by the local entity. Instead, they countered 
that a properly and prudently crafted power-purchase agreement (PPA) could provide for 
the resilience provisions described herein. Essentially, regardless of who owns the solar 
array, as long as the purveyor of the clean energy agrees contractually to incorporate 
battery backup in some capacity and then agrees to provide the backup power generated 
back to the local entity in the event of a grid failure, the benefits of resiliency are still 
achieved without the local entity owning the system. 
 In parallel, it was proposed via the feedback received, that community 
compensation for hosting renewable energy projects in New Jersey is actually occurring 
regularly via PPAs and the associated benefits to the host community. For example, a 
municipality that enters into a PPA to install solar at a school will not own the array, but 
will receive a rent payment for the roof space or land used for the installation. This rent 
payment can be considered community compensation. Also, it was raised that often times 
PPA’s with local entities include sale of the clean energy back to the entity hosting the 
array at a cost less than the local utility would provide. This cost savings could also be 
considered community compensation. 
 Additionally, the feedback provided by the panel revealed that a powerful tool 
exists to push forward the goal of local-level solar with resiliency benefits – the PPA 
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(power-purchase agreement) itself. If local ownership of the array is not in fact necessary 
for resiliency benefits to be realized, and the PPA itself can be a mechanism for 
distributing community-compensation benefits, then it seems to be that the PPA sits at the 
epicenter for action that furthers several of the goals described herein. Perhaps the key to 
broader proliferation of community-level solar projects that can help communities 
become more resilient lies in the crafting of PPAs that capitalize on all of the ways that 
the local entity can benefit from hosting a solar installation. 
 The panel of experts unanimously supported the idea of encouraging greater 
partnership between private solar developers and public entities hoping to install solar 
arrays with backup-power options. Perhaps private developers could work with public 
officials to craft a PPA template that could be used as an industry standard whenever a 
solar host site is public. In such cases, provisions for battery-backup power (perhaps via a 
dynamic inverter) could become standard as well as provisions that require the owner of 
the array to provide the backup power to the public host facility in a time of emergency. 
The state could play a role in educating local governments with respect to why they 
should require these types of provisions from any solar developer responding to a 
Request for Proposal (RFP) put out by the local government for a solar installation. 
 
6.3 Summary 
The analysis of climate-change work occurring at the local level, in addition to the case 
study review of both community renewable energy projects and policy tools that allow 
them to occur, reveal a number of conclusions. First and foremost, community renewable 
energy projects are a critical tool in providing resiliency benefits to local communities. 
Resilience in turn allows communities to better adapt to a changing climate. The very 
nature of a solar project as a clean-energy producer makes it a powerful mitigation tool. 
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 As learned from Garrett Hardin, sometimes government intervention is necessary 
to right the wrongs of society when personal greed overshadows what is best for the 
community. And yet, Elinor Ostrum’s work also compels consideration that the 
community itself might be in a better position to craft the right policy to self-govern in a 
time of stress resulting from overconsumption. Taking a page from both Hardin and 
Ostrum, the conclusion can be drawn that local-level policy, with higher level state and 
federal support, is what is needed to effectuate comprehensive change in the face of a 
changing climate.  
 As is the case with any policy that hopes to be effective, state and even federal 
support is necessary. With this in mind, perhaps the most meaningful conclusion to be 
drawn is that there is a significant reason why climate-change action is occurring at the 
local level. This phenomenon itself could be an example of Ostrum’s theory of local 
communities acting in their own self-interest even in the absence of intervention from 
higher levels of government. The state and federal government can provide support and 
resources, but in the end it might be up to local communities to act in their own self-
interest to plan for the effects of climate-change. Just as the people of Fintry, the founders 
of the Brighton Solar Co-op, and local officials in Bayonne, New Jersey, acted on their 
own behalf, so too can communities in New Jersey that wish to become more resilient in 
the face of climate-change. 
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